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If the past is prologue, tax advisors (lawyers and accountants) have
good reason to be careful and scrupulous in the practice of their pro-
fessions.
They have been and undoubtedly will continue to be civil and criminal
targets of the IRS and of the Department of Justice with respect to
their own tax liabilities and the liabilities of third persons. As sum-
marized in a recent presentation to the Southern Federal Tax Con-
ference', the tax practitioner is always a potential target. He is "the
expert who knows the rules and calls the shots". Those involved in a
disputed tax transaction may claim reliance upon him, when the chips
are down and, indeed, accuse him of responsibility for any illegality in-
volved. Moreover, nothing would appear to be more desirable to the
IRS and the Department of Justice, from a deterrence point of view,
than the successful prosecution of a tax advisor.
As to the civil tax liability of the tax advisor, it is significant that a
leading weekly law journal published recently a feature article entitled
"What the IRS Looks For In a Lawyer's Tax Return". 2 Pointing out
the apparently small percentage of audit probability (less than one
percent for those filing individual returns, if wages are subject to with-
holding and the filer takes the standard deduction; partnership returns-
probably less than 11 percent; professional corporations-about 4 per-
cent if corporate assets are under $100,000; Subchapter S corporations,
infrequently used-about 2 percent)-the article warns nevertheless
that the "IRS will predictably focus on certain items". In the "absolutely
certain" category of such items are entertainment, promotional, auto-
mobile and travel expenses. In the "highly likely" category are bank
deposits, expenses advanced for clients, insurance expense, pension and
profit sharing plans and compliance with payroll tax requirements. In
the "less likely" category are repairs, depreciation of leasehold improve-
ments, equipment leases, and salvage value of automobiles. The per-
centage of audit probability may not seem foreboding; but the increased
trend towards the investigation of "white collar" personnel should warn
that the consequences of an audit should not be lightly regarded, even
if it results only in a deficiency, including penalties.
This paper will not discuss the manifold civil tax cases in which
lawyers and accountants are involved with respect to their own in-
dividual liabilities. These may result not only in a substantial deficiency
I Bray, "Targeting Attorneys and Accountants for Prosecutieon and Civil
Liability."
2 Raby and Kantor, The National Law Journal, April 2, 1979.
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but also in the imposition of the burdensome 50% fraud penalty. The
possibilities for such involvement are as broad as the provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code. No useful purpose will be served by enumera-
tion and discussion of those possibilities here. Parenthetically, it may be
noted that where a taxpayer's deficiency and fraud penalty liability
results in whole or in part from the tax advisor's inept or ill-considered
advice, the advisor suffers no serious consequence (other than the
possible loss of a client and professional discipline); the fraud penalty
assessed against the taxpayer cannot be assessed against the advisor.
There are special civil penalties for tax return preparers which may
be appropriately noted here. Sec. 6694(a) imposes a $100/penalty for
the negligent or intentional disregard of rules and regulations. Sec.
6694(b) imposes a $500 penalty for the willfull understatement of
liability, reduced by the amount of the penalty paid by reason of the
application of Sec. 6694(a). Sec. 6695 sets forth various penalties for
the failure of return preparers to observe the rules with respect to the
preparation of income tax returns for others, unless the failure is due
to reasonable cause and not to willful neglect. Thus, Sec. 6695(a)
imposes a $25 penalty for the failure to furnish taxpayer with a copy
of his return or claim for refund. Sec. 6695(b) imposes a $25 penalty
for the failure to sign a return. Sec. 6695 (c) imposes a $25 penalty for
failure to furnish an identifying number. Sec. 6695 (d) imposes a penalty
of $50 for failure to retain for three years after the close of the return
period a copy of the return or claim or a list of names and identifying
numbers of taxpayers for whom returns or claims were prepared. This
section provides that the maximum penalty on any person for any
return period shall be $25,000. Sec. 6695(e) imposes a $100 penalty
for the failure to file a correct information return; a penalty of $5 for
each failure to set forth an item as required; and it imposes a maximum
penalty of $20,000 for any return period. Sec. 6695(f) imposes a
penalty of $500 for the endorsement or negotiation of a check with
regard to income taxes issued to a taxpayer. 3
The major threat to the tax advisor is of course his possible investiga-
tion and prosecution on criminal tax charges. If that occurs, he may be
the object of aggressive action by law enforcement officials because he
is a professional. As one writer has stated, "preliminary findings from
a survey of defense lawyers nationwide show that more and more
lawyers are being subjected to grand jury probes, wiretaps, search war-
rants and tax audits". A Justice Department assistant attorney general is
quoted as saying: "We have to be sensitive to the attorney-client privi-
lege, but we must also examine quite closely any indication that the
attorney may be part of a criminal conspiracy." Moreover, the tax
8 Kelly, "Criminal and Civil Sanctions for Tax Practitioners."
4 Burke, "Are Lawmen Hounding Lawyers?", The National Law Journal,
August 6, 1979.
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advisor convicted on criminal tax charges may be the victim of an
apparent trend of the courts to impose jail sentences in "white collar"
crimes. One attorney who has defended many of his lawyer brethren
recently observed: "The courts are treating attorneys harsher and
harsher. It almost cuts against you to be an attorney when you're
sentenced. More and more lawyers are getting sent to jail. In the old
days, it was given a great deal of consideration that the lawyer had
suffered disgrace and dishonor." 5
For an opposing sentiment as to the probability of a jail sentence or
a severe jail sentence for the convicted tax advisor, indicated more than
ten years ago at a Pilot Institute on Sentencing Tax Violators, held at
the University of Colorado on July 16 and 17, 1969, see the comments
of United States District Court Judges O'Sullivan and Goodman.6 Judge
O'Sullivan:
I think there is one thing we should always keep in mind.
While we have the right to hold lawyers, doctors and successful
businessmen to a higher standard of integrity and morality,
we should nonetheless appreciate that they are still human
beings with the same weaknesses that are possessed by persons
who hold positions of less prestige in the community. Al-
though it may be more popular to do so, I doubt whether we
should be moved in all instances to impose a severe sentence
upon a doctor or lawyer. I do not think we should have a dif-
ferent standard for a professional man than for others. I there-
fore do not believe that we ought to say, as a general rule, that
every lawyer, doctor, C.P.A., industrialist, or other executive
who violates the income tax law should go to jail.
Judge Goodman:
In sentencing the non-gangster type of income tax violator I
have not seen a probation report on the basis of which I could
not say that the defendant was a good probation risk. This is
because of the nature of the offense. Every probation report
involving income tax violations by doctors, lawyers, and big
merchants show that they are suitable for probation. Sentenc-
ing the income tax violator presents a different sort of problem
than that presented by other Federal offenses where there may
be a difficult question as to whether the offender is a suitable
risk for probation. Therefore, the basis for sending a person to
prison for an income tax violation may be different than that
present in other types of offenses where the criterion may be
his unsuitability for probation.
Bodine, "Attorney's Jail Term Called Trend in 'White Collar' Crime", The
National Law Jourrial, October 30, 1978.
6 Report on Role of Sanctions in Tax Compliance (IRS) (September 1968).
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In a sense, the tax advisor implicated personally in a substantial
civil tax case or in criminal tax litigation is always the loser. The con-
sequences of such implication, especially in a criminal case, may be
devastating. They are correctly summarized in the Garbis-Namorato
article (fn.1): The lawyer or accountant suffers considerable cost in
terms of lost time and professional fees. During the period of investiga-
tion by the Criminal Investigation Division of the IRS, knowledge of
the investigation somehow seeps through to IRS personnel, to the local
members of the Bar and of the accounting profession (and nationwide
if prominent figures are involved), to clients and to the general public.
The tax advisor may suffer intense anxiety and resulting serious health
impairment. 7 The cost of defending criminal charges may drain him
financially. If convicted, there may be not only a heavy fine but also a
jail sentence. Conviction may result in the loss of his professional
license. And even if he is acquitted of the charges, the intense publicity
attending indictment and trial is certain to adversely affect his reputa-
tion, and perhaps permanently.
What are the types of cases in which tax advisors have become
criminally involved? And what are the criminal provisions to which
they are subject? The writers on this subject have generally agreed
that the criminal cases fall into well defined categories,8 constituting
clear signposts of danger for the tax practitioner and affording ample
warning of the types of transactions which may lead to their investigation
and prosecution.
The Government's array of penal provisions is formidable. What
follows is a listing of the chief provisions and the penalties involved:
18 U.S.C., Sec. 371-conspiring either to commit any offense
against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or
any agency thereof in any manner or for any purposes.
7 The writer recalls an extreme incident which occurred when he was chief of
the Tax Division's Criminal Section. A young Wisconsin professional, prior to
his entry on duty in World War II had arranged with a fellow professional to
carry on his practice and to divert to his wife weekly amounts of $50, the receipt
of which from earnings were not to be reported on his returns. During a final
conference in the case, immediately prior to the anticipated return of an indict-
ment, taxpayer's counsel, who had consistently warned that his client could not
emotionally withstand indictment and trial, received a telephone message that
the case had been "mooted". His client had committed suicide.
8 See Bray, "Targeting Attorneys and Accountants for Prosecution and Civil
Liability", Proceedings of the N.Y.U. 36th Annual Institute on Federal Taxation
(1978); Bailor and Wilson, "The Tax Advisor as a Criminal Target"; Garbis and
Namorato, "United States v. Taxpayer's Representative: Criminal Exposure of
Tax Professionals"; Kelly, "Criminal and Civil Sanction for Tax Practitioners";
Sisson, "The Sandman Cometh: Conspiracy Prosecutions and Tax Practitioners",
The Tax Lawyer, Vol. 31, No. 3, Spring 1978.
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$10,000 fine or imprisonment for not more than five years,
or both.9
18 U.S.C., Sec. 1001-knowingly and willfully falsifying,
concealing or covering up by any trick, scheme, or device a
material fact, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any
department or agency of the United States, or making any
false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or
making or using any false writing or document knowing the
same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement
or entry. (Sometimes referred to as the false statement statute.)
$10,000 fine or imprisonment for not more than five years, or
both.
26 U.S.C., Sec. 7201-willfully attempting in any manner to
evade or defeat any tax or the payment thereof. (Sometimes
referred to as the evasion statute.) $10,000 fine or imprison-
ment for not more than five years, or both.
26 U.S.C., Sec. 7206 (1)-willfully making and subscribing
any return, statement, other document, which contains or is
verified by a written declaration that it is made under the
penalties of perjury, and which the maker and subscriber
does not believe to be true and correct as to every material
matter. (Sometimes referred to as the false return statute.)
$5,000 fine, or imprisonment for not more than three years,
or both.
26 U.S.C., Sec. 7206 (2)-willfully aiding or assisting in, or
procuring, counseling, or advising the preparation or presenta-
tion of a return or other document which is fraudulent or is
false as to any material matter, whether or not such falsity or
fraud is with the knowledge or consent of the person autho-
rized or required to present such return or document. (This
provision was chiefly designed to prosecute tax return pre-
parers who, whether with the collusion of taxpayers or not,
prepared false returns.) $5,000 fine, or imprisonment for not
more than three years, or both.
Probably the most intriguing prosecutions of tax lawyers and ac-
countants in recent years have been the evasion and conspiracy prosecu-
tions of prominent tax shelter specialists. These arose out of IRS'
Project Haven, a lengthy IRS and Department of Justice probe of
offshore tax shelters and secret Bahamian bank accounts. This is the
probe that led to the notorious "brief case incident". Using the services
of a beguiling female, the Government surreptitiously obtained access
to a tax-haven-bank officer's brief case while the officer and the lady
were out having dinner together. The brief case was opened and in it
was a veritable gold mine of information concerning American de-
9 For a scholarly treatment of the arguments against use of the conspiracy
to defraud statute, see Goldstein, "Conspiracy to Defraud the United States", 68
Yale Law Journal 405 (Jan. 1959).
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positors in the Bahamian bank, some 325 items, including the names
of individuals and entities who were depositors. This incident led to
the suppression of virtually all of the evidence and the acquittal of the
taxpayer-defendant in United States v. Payner °. The trial judge had
actually determined that the defendant was guilty of violating 18 U.S.C.,
Sec. 1001 because he had given a false answer to a question on his
1972 return with respect to disclosure of foreign financial accounts,
but was constrained to suppress the use of the tainted evidence. The
Sixth Circuit affirmed.
In United States v. Margolis", the San Francisco tax shelter advisers
were charged with forming a complex tax shelter conspiracy, and of
generating questionable loans and large interest deductions. The in-
dictment contained many substantive counts of violations of 26 U.S.C.,
Sec. 7206 (2), and a conspiracy count. The latter was a so-called
"Klein" 12 conspiracy to defraud the United States in the exercise of
its governmental functions by impeding, impairing, obstructing and
defeating the lawful functions of the IRS in ascertaining, computing,
assessing, managing and collecting the revenue. The long trial in the
case ended in disaster for the Government. One of Margolis' co-de-
fendants was acquitted at the conclusion of the Government's case. Ac-
cording to a report in U.S. Tax Week, August 1977, this defendant
had once been a well-to-do tax attorney, but the litigation cost him
$50,000 in legal fees and a loss of $200,000 in his practice. Margolis
was acquitted at the conclusion of the case, much to the Government's
disappointment.
In United States v. Baskes13, two partners in a prominent Chicago
law firm were indicted in connection with an alleged scheme falsely to
allocate the proceeds of the sale of a property, which was subject to
heavy recapture, to a wholly different and virtually valueless capital
asset. Seven hundred thousand dollars of the purchase price of a
particular property (an apartment and office building) was falsely
allocated to an unpatented mining claim. Damaging to the defendants
was evidence in the case that one of the defendant-attorneys had ex-
plained, in a meeting with the clients, that steps should be taken to
separate in points of time the sale of the real estate and the sale of the
mining claim so as to prevent the IRS from unravelling the true nature of
the transactions.
Cases like Margolis and Baskes, standing on their own facts, perhaps
have little value as precedent in trying to divine what reaction the IRS
and the Department of Justice will have to any given set of proposed
10 572 F.2d 144 (C.A. 6 1978).
11 Cr. No. 76-702 (N.D. Calif. 1975).
12 U.S. v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908 (C.A. 2 1957).
"3433 F. Supp. 759 (N.D. I11. 1977); 442 F. Supp. 322 (N.D. Il1. 1977).
TAX CONFERENCE
or anticipated tax shelter plans. But, as one writer has stated,'14 these
cases point to several troubling truths: lawyers and accountants stand
to be indicted for tax advice deemed to be dishonest, even while their
clients are not charged; prominent and respected members of the
accounting and legal professions are by no means exempt from Margolis
and Baskes type charges; and a charge of conspiracy to defraud the
United States may be brought despite the complexity of the civil tax
questions which may be involved, despite the intricacy of the transactions
and the arguable propriety of each step in the alleged illegal scheme.
Tax lawyers and accountants should be aware of the fact that proper
and technically accurate labels (from their viewpoint) which they apply
to tax transactions may be regarded as criminal labels by the Govern-
ment, particularly if the transactions are the brain children of the ad-
visors, despite the possible sophistication of their taxpayer-clients in
business matters. It must always be remembered that there is and has
always been a thin line between legitimate avoidance and evasion.
Moreover, there are indications of more aggressive activity in the tax
shelter area. About two years ago, IRS announced an escalation of
emphasis on the returns of partnerships, a much used vehicle for syndi-
cating tax shelters. The coverage of partnership returns may be ex-
tended, particularly as to those partnerships with more than ten partners
and with income in excess of $500,000. Also, there appears to be an
increased effort at coordination among IRS district offices with respect
to attacks on popular tax shelters: the control of real estate tax shelters
from a central office in San Francisco; the control of oil and gas tax
shelters from a central office in Dallas; and control of movie negative
pickup shelters from a control office in St. Louis.
It must be anticipated that IRS attacks against tax shelters will be
very consciously planned and that the risk of investigation and prosecu-
tion must be calculated. This is not to say that an agent's suspicions
must always give rise to extreme action. Hopefully, the tax lawyer or
accountant advising his client should be able to take questionable posi-
tions which have a rational and arguable basis in law or accounting
without fear of being criminally struck down.
In addition to transactions involving foreign tax shelters, the follow-
ing types of activities and transactions have involved taxpayers and
their advisors in a substantial amount of civil and criminal litigation:
the backdating of documents; 5 sham transactions, e.g., the use of
14 Bray, "Targeting Attorneys and Accountants for Prosecution and Civil Lia-
bility", supra.
'See "Some Thoughts on Improper Backdating," The Journal of Taxation,
March 1976, p. 190; U.S. v. DeMarco, 550 F.2d 1224 (C.A. 9 1977); U.S. v.
Henderson, 386 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); U.S. v. Crum, 529 F.2d 1380
(C.A. 9 1976).
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multiple corporations,"0 family partnerships, 7  trusts with multiple
beneficiaries,' 8 wash sales, 19 transfers and transfers back,2" sales and
leasebacks, 21 sham loans, 22 fictitious interest deductions,23 purchases of
tax loss entities;24 assignments of income;'-'' step transactions; 6 the
misuse of tax exempt and tax loss entities;27 whipsaw cases.28 All these
are compactly dealt with in Bray,'29 "Targeting Attorneys and Account-
ants for Prosecution and Civil Liability".
The Bray article correctly points out that the transactions listed above
historically have simply been considered inappropriate for criminal
charges, resulting in the extreme in the imposition of the fraud penalty.
However, there are factors which point to the possibility of criminal
prosecution in situations previously subject only to civil penalty: the
trend towards aggressive governmental action with respect to "white
collar" crimes; the past history of criminal prosecution of tax advisors;
the judicial diminution of privileges hitherto more or less safely relied
upon by prospective defendants; the likelihood of continued economic
10 Slappey Drive Ind. Park v. U.S., 561 F.2d 572 (C.A. 5 1977), affirming a
holding that one of a group of corporations was formed primarily for tax avoid-
ance. For the use of shell corporations in a non-tax context, see U.S. v. Benjamin,
328 F.2d 854 (C.A. 2 1964) (Attorneys convicted of setting up shell corporations
and assisting in selling stock; accountants also convicted of compiling false finan-
cial statements for the shell corporations and the use of financial statements to
sell stock); U.S. v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928 (C.A. 2 1961) (Attorneys convicted of
seeting up shell corporations and selling unregistered securities.) The court said
in Benjamin that "In our complex society *** the lawyer's opinion can be (an)
instrument for inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel or the crow-
bar *** Congress equally could not have intended men holding themselves out
as members of these ancient professions (attorney and accountant) should be
able to escape criminal liability on a plea of ignorance when they have shut their
eyes to what was plainly to be seen or have represented a knowledge they knew
they did not possess."
'7 Michaels v. Comm'r, 15 T.C.M. 1344.
'1 Brock v. Comm'r, 22 T.C. 284 (1954).
19 A common concept in securities cases as well as tax cases; proscribed by
Sec. 9(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C., Sec. 78i(a)(1).20 Mitchell v. Comm'r, 32 B.T.A. 1093; Smith v. Comm'r, 40 B.T.A. 387
(1939).
21 Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252 (1939).
22 Thompson v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 1054 (1976), dealing with more than 100
taxpayers investing in the plans attacked in Project Haven.
23 Id.
24 Sec. 172, Internal Revenue Code of 1954; but see Libson Shops v. Koehler,
353 U.S. 382 (1957).
25 U.S. v. Carleton, 138 F. Supp. 516 (D.C. Okla. 1956).
26 Court Holding Co. v. Comm'r, 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
27 See Bray, "Targeting Attorneys and Accountants for Prosecution and Civil
Liability", supra, p. 1250.
281Id., p. 1251: "*** whipsaw cases should be added to the list of issues
which, when ignited by a spark of concealment or misrepresentation, carry suf-
ficient volatility to explode into a criminal charge."29 Id.
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adversity and the high rate of taxation. The Bray article (p. 1252) there-
fore gives the following advice to tax advisors "to assist in keeping them
beyond the abyss of criminal enforcement:
(1) Do assure that the overall transaction is not riddled with
borderline acts or techniques;
(2) Do assure that there is nothing about the transaction that
rings of deception, misrepresentation or camouflage;
(3) Do assure that all mechanical steps that purport to have
been taken were in fact done as represented by the docu-
ments;
(4) Do review all internal memoranda of the client and all
working papers and memoranda of the accountants con-
cerning comments about the transaction and the motiva-
tion for the transaction that might, during an investiga-
tion, cast a horrifying light on the transaction;
(5) Do transmit tax advice and directions for implementing
the transaction in writing to the client;
(6) Don't transmit any legal advice orally or in writing to
anyone but the client;
(7) Don't permit any fee to be expressly contingent or con-
tingent as a practical matter upon achieving a substantial
tax saving in any risky tax transaction;
(8) Don't backdate any documents unless the document must
speak "as of" a certain date and then use the words "as
of" and correctly recite when signatures were actually
appended to the document;
(9) Don't omit any physical, mechanical, filing, fee, notariza-
tion, or other apparently trivial requirements necessary
for consistency with the form you have selected for the
transaction;
(10) Don't do the transaction if its success would depend
upon any side agreement or understanding which you
would be unwilling to disclose to the Intelligence Di-
vision."
Recent developments in cases involving the evocation of "privilege"
indicate a probable diminution of protection in that area of the law
for those under investigation for possible criminal tax prosecution. That
development provides another reason, in addition to those already dis-
cussed, for tax advisors' apprehension and circumspect practice of
their professions. Among the cases to be considered here are Couch v.
United States,30 Fisher v. United States,"' Bellis v. United States, "
United States v. Coopers & Lybrand,33 United States v. Upjohn Co.3'
30 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
.31425 U.S. 391 (1976).
32417 U.S. 85 (1974).
33 550 F.2d 615 (C.A. 10 1977).
34 600 F.2d 1223 (C.A. 6 1979).
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Couch involved the issuance of an IRS summons 35 to taxpayer's
accountant, an independent contractor with many clients, for the
production of taxpayer's business records (bank statements, payroll
records, reports of sales and expenditures) which taxpayer had given
the accountant for the preparation of her tax returns covering a number
of years. Concededly, when taxpayer surrendered possession of the
records to the accountant, she retained title in herself. The summons
was issued after the accountant refused to let the special agent see,
remove, or microfilm the records. When the special agent arrived at the
accountant's office on the return day of the summons, he discovered
that, at the taxpayer's request, the accountant had delivered the records
to taxpayer's attorney. After institution of enforcement proceedings,6
taxpayer was permitted to intervene 37 and she asserted that her owner-
ship of the records warranted a Fifth Amendment privilege to bar their
production. The Court rejected the assertion. It held, in line with its
prior decisions in the area, that the Fifth Amendment privilege is a
personal privilege; that in the case before it the ingredient of personal
compulsion was lacking; that the summons and the District Court's
order were directed against the accountant; that he, and not the tax-
payer, was the only one compelled to do anything; that (p. 329) "no
shadow of testimonial compulsion upon or enforced communication by
the accused" was involved. The Court reiterated Mr. Justice Holmes'
pithy conclusion3 8 that "A party is privileged from producing the
evidence but not from its production."
Distinguishing the decision in Boyd v. United States9 from the facts
in Couch, the Court noted that the person asserting the privilege in
Boyd was in possession of the material in question. The Court rejected
the hypothesized suggestion that it should read Boyd as marking owner-
ship, not possession, as the bounds of the privilege, holding that, in its
view, possession bears the closest relationship to the personal com-
pulsion forbidden by the Fifth Amendment. To tie the privilege against
self-incrimination to a concept of ownership (p. 331):
would be to draw a meaningless line. It would hold here that
the business records which petitioner actually owned would
be protected in the hands of her accountant, while business
information communicated to her accountant by letter and
conversations in which the accountant took notes, in addition
to the accountant's own workpapers and photocopies of peti-
tioner's records, would not be subject to a claim of privilege
since title rested in the accountant. Such a holding would
3 26 U.S.C., Sec. 7602.
36 26 U.S.C. Sections 7402(b) and 7604(a).
37 Since October 17, 1976, taxpayers have an absolute right to intervene, under
26 U.S.C., Sec. 7609(b).
381ohnson v. U.S., 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913).
39 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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thus place unnecessary emphasis on the form of communica-
tion to an accountant and the accountant's own working
methods, while diverting the inquiry from the basic purposes
of the Fifth Amendment's protections.
In Couch, taxpayer had contended that the confidential nature of
the accountant-client relationship and her resulting expectation of
privacy in delivering the records to her accountant protected her under
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments from their production. The Court
rejected that contention, noting that no confidential accountant-client
privilege exists under federal law and that no state-created privilege
has been recognized in federal cases. 40 Moreover, it pointed out that
there is no justification for a confidential accountant-client privilege
(p. 335):
where records relevant to income tax returns are involved in
a criminal investigation or prosecution. * * * there can be
little expectation of privacy where records are handed to an
accountant, knowing that mandatory disclosure of much of
the information therein is required in an income tax return.
What information is not disclosed is largely in the account-
ant's discretion, not petitioner's. Indeed, the accountant him-
self risks criminal prosecution if he wilfully assists in the prep-
aration of a false return. 26 U.S.C. Sec. 7206(2). His own
need for self-protection would often require the right to dis-
close the information given him. Petitioner seeks extensions of
constitutional protections against self-incrimination in the very
stiuation where obligations of disclosure exist and under a
system largely dependent upon honest self-reporting even to
survive. Accordingly, petitioner here cannot reasonably claim,
either for Fourth or Fifth Amendment purposes, an expecta-
tion of protected privacy or confidentiality.
It is important to note the caveat in Couch. The Court conceded that
in a case where the taxpayer's relinquished possession of his own books
and records to his accountant is "temporary and insignificant", where
there is no more than a "mere fleeting divestment of possession", where
the accountant works in the taxpayer's office or is taxpayer's employee-
"constructive possession *** (may be) so clear *** as to leave the
personal compulsions upon the accused substantially intact." (Pp. 333-
334) In such circumstances the Fifth Amendment privilege could be
successfully invoked.
The Fisher case and the companion case of United States v. Kasmir"'
present the question whether a summons directing an attorney to produce
4 0 Falsone v. U.S., 205 F.2d 734 (C.A. 5 1953), cert. den. 346 U.S. 864;
Gariepy v. U.S., 189 F.2d 459, 463-464 (C.A. 6 1951); Himmelfarb v. U.S., 175
F.2d 924, 939 (C.A. 9 1949), cert. den. 338 U.S. 860; O'Lender v. U.S., 210
F.2d 795, 806 (C.A. 9 1954).
41 No. 74-611.
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documents delivered to him by his client in connection with the attorney-
client relationship was enforceable over claims that the documents
were constitutionally immune from summons in the hands of the client
and retained that immunity in the hands of the attorney. The same
basic factual situation was present in both cases. The taxpayers were
under investigation for possible civil or criminal tax liability. They ob-
tained from their accountants certain documents relating to the ac-
countants' preparation of their tax returns and then transferred the
documents to their attorneys (Fisher and Kasmir) so that the latter
could assist them in connection with the investigations. Subsequently,
the IRS served summonses on the attorneys directing the production
of the documents. The attorneys refused to comply. Enforcement pro-
ceedings ensued and in each case the District Court ordered compliance
with the summons. In Fisher, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the taxpayer had never acquired
a possessory interest in the documents and that the documents were
not immune from production in the attorney's hands. In the Kasmir
case the Fifth Circuit reversed. It held that by virtue of the Fifth
Amendment the documents would have been privileged from produc-
tion pursuant to a summons directed to the taxpayer if he had retained
possession, and that in light of the attorney-client relationship, the
taxpayer retained such privilege after transfer of the documents to his
attorney.
The Supreme Court held that the documents were not privileged
either in the hands of the lawyers or their clients. As to the taxpayer-
clients, it reasoned that their Fifth Amendment rights were not violated
by enforcement of the summonses because (p. 397) "enforcement
against a taxpayer's lawyer would not 'compel' the taxpayer to do
anything-and certainly would not compel him to be a 'witness'
against himself." As held in Couch, the Fifth Amendment is limited to
prohibiting the use of physical or moral compulsion exerted on the
person asserting the privilege. Requiring the lawyer to produce in-
volves no compulsion on the taxpayer-client, and this is true (pp. 397-
399):
whether or not the Amendment would have barred a sub-
poena directing the taxpayer to produce the documents while
they were in his hands.
The fact that the attorneys are agents of the taxpayers does
not change this result. Couch held as much, since the account-
ant there was also the taxpayer's agent, and in this respect
reflected a longstanding view.
Here, the taxpayers retained any privilege they ever had not
to be compelled to testify against themselves and not to be
compelled themselves to produce private papers in their pos-
session. This personal privilege was in no way decreased by
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the transfer. It is simply that by reason of the transfer of the
documents to the attorneys, those papers may be subpoenaed
without compulsion on the taxpapers. The protection of the
Fifth Amendment is therefore not available.
In the Kasmir case the Fifth Circuit had suggested that because
the lawyer legally and ethically was required to respect the con-
fidences of his client, the latter had a reasonable expectation of privacy
for the records in the attorney's possession and therefore did not forfeit
his Fifth Amendment privilege by transferring them in order to obtain
legal advice. The Supreme Court rejected this suggestion. It held that
the Framers had addressed the subject of personal privacy directly in
the Fourth Amendment, did not seek to achieve a general protection
of privacy in the Fifth Amendment but rather sought to deal in the
Fifth Amendment with the more specific issue of compelled self-
incrimination. Indeed, stated the Court (p. 399), it "has never on any
ground, personal privacy included, applied the Fifth Amendment to
prevent the otherwise proper acquisition or use of evidence which, in
the Court's view, did not involve compelled testimonial self-incrimina-
tion of some sort."
The Fisher decision finally addressed the question whether applica-
tion of the attorney-client privilege barred production of the materials
in question. It agreed that if documents are transferred by a client to
an attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, the attorney in
possession is not bound to produce (p. 404) "when the client himself
would be privileged from production of the documents ***." Accord-
ingly, the Court proceeded to the question whether the documents
involved in Fisher and Kasmir could have been obtained by summons
addressed to the taxpayers while the documents were in their posses-
sion. In responding in the negative, the Court asserted that the Fifth
Amendment would not be violated by the fact alone that the papers
in question might incriminate the taxpayers, since the privilege protects
a person only against being incriminated by his own compelled testi-
monial communications. Here, the Court said (p. 410), "In the light
of the records now before us, we are confident that however incriminat-
ing the contents of the accountant's work papers might be, the act of
producing them-the only thing which the taxpayer is compelled to do-
would not of itself involve testimonial self-incrimination." Moreover,
in light of the fact that it is not illegal for a taxpayer to seek accounting
help in connection with his tax returns or for the accountant to prepare
workpapers and deliver them to the taxpayer, the Court (p. 412) found
itself "At this juncture, quite unprepared to hold that either the fact of
existence of the papers or of their possession by the taxpayer poses
any realistic threat of incrimination to the taxpayer." 42
42 In connection with the Court's listing of the non-testimonial instances (p.
408) in which it has declined to extend the protection of the Fifth Amendment
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The Bellis case, the last of a series of Supreme Court decisions deal-
ing with the susceptibility of entity records to compelled production, 43
established the proposition that the books and records of a dissolved
three-man law partnership were subject to production upon issuance of
a grand jury subpoena to a former partner in possession of the records.
The Court held, in line with the rationale of its prior decisions, that the
partnership involved was an independent entity apart from its in-
dividual members; that it was a well organized and structured group
and not merely a loose, informal association of individuals or a tem-
porary arrangement for the undertaking of a few projects of short-lived
duration; that its records were partnership records and not individual
records; and that Bellis held them in a representative capacity and not
in a purely personal capacity. Therefore, Bellis could claim no Fifth
Amendment privilege with respect to their production.
In arriving at this conclusion, the Court noted the partnership's
formal institutional arrangement for the continuing conduct of a law
practice; its actual existence for fifteen years prior to its dissolution;
the fact that state partnership law imposed on the firm a certain or-
ganizational structure; the maintenance of a partnership bank account;
the use of the firm name on stationery letter-heads; the filing of
separate partnership returns for federal tax purposes; litigation con-
ducted in the name of the partnership; the holding of title to property
in the name of the partnership. The Court also held that Bellis had no
direct ownership interest in the partnership records, that under state
law they were the property of the partnership and that under state law
he held them subject to the rights granted to the other partners. Nor did
he have any right to use partnership property for other than partnership
purposes.
Adverting to the White test for determining whether individual mem-
bers of an entity possessed Fifth Amendment rights with respect to
entity records-whether the organization involved (p. 100) "has a
character so impersonal in the scope of its membership and activities
that it cannot be said to embody or represent the purely private or per-
sonal interests of its constituents"-the Court in Bellis stated that it
did not believe that the formulation in White could be reduced to a
simple proposition based solely on the size of an organization. Neverthe-
privilege to the giving of blood samples, handwriting and voice examplars, and
the donning of a blouse worn by alleged perpetrator of a crime, see U.S. v.
Eiuge, No. 78-1453, October Term (1978), in which there is pending before the
Supreme Court the question whether the IRS has statutory authority to issue a
summons requiring a person to appear and execute handwriting exemplars in aid
of an administrative investigation to determine his correct tax liability.
4' See Wilson v. U.S., 221 U.S. 361 (1911) (records of an extant corporation);
Wheeler v. U.S., 226 U.S. 478 (1913) (records of a dissolved corporation); Grant
v. U.S., 227 U.S. 74 (1913) (records of a dissolved sole-shareholder corpora-
tion); U.S. v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944) (records of an unincorporated labor
union).
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less, the Court appeared to agree with the Solicitor General's statement
on brief that it is difficult to know precisely what situations are covered
by the White formulation, witness the Court's concession (p. 100) that
the Bellis case embodied neither "purely *** personal interests" nor
"'group interests only", but rather some combination of the two. Perhaps
the considerations underlying that concession account for the Court's
final warning in Bellis (p. 101 ) :
This might be a different case if it involved a small family
partnership * * * or, as the Solicitor General suggests * * *
if there were some other pre-existing relationship of any con-
fidentiality among the partners.
In a recent article, a former Commissioner of Internal Revenue
calls attention to the reignition of a longstanding dispute between IRS
and accounting profession concerning the production of accountants'
tax accrual files. These files are of particular interest to the IRS be-
cause they "pinpoint the precise issues the client thinks are vulnerable
to IRS attack during an examination"." However, in the view of the
AICPA they reflect merely opinions, projections, judgments and have
no relevance to the preparation of yearly returns. The dispute is
reflected in two recent decisions: Coopers & Lybrand and United
States v. Noall.45
Coopers & Lybrand (C&L) was a victory for the taxpayer, the Johns-
Manville corporation (J-M) and for the accounting profession. A
summons was issued to C&L to produce voluminous workpapers and
documents comprising its audit program or tax pool analysis file for
its client, J-M. The audit program was a master plan specifically tailored
for auditing J-M; the tax pool analysis file contained estimates of J-M's
contingent liabilities for future income periods, utilized by J-M in
preparing SEC-required financial statements and in verifying that the
statements were prepared in accordance with generally accepted ac-
counting principles. Neither was used in the preparation of the J-M
returns for the years under investigation.
C&L refused to comply with the summons. The IRS agent testified
at the enforcement hearing that the audit program would bear on
J-M's intent and (p. 617) "would assist us in determining whether or
not to pursue a particular area," and that the tax pool analysis file might
be relevant as a source of possible inconsistent positions or improper
figures. The Government's position was rejected. As the Tenth Circuit
concluded, C&L was not responsible for the preparation or review of
the returns for the years under investigation and did not prepare the
audit program in conjunction with or in any manner in connection
44 Caplin, "Should the Service be permitted to reach accountants' tax accrual
workpapers?", The Journal of Taxation, October 1979, p. 194.
45 587 F.2d 123 (C.A. 2 1978).
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with the preparation of those returns. Accordingly, the IRS had failed
to show the requisite relevance of the audit program to the tax in-
vestigation. Further, the audit program was found to contain no
factual data regarding any J-M transactions; rather, the audit program
consisted solely of a listing of procedures to be followed by C&L
personnel in examining J-M books and records, documentation of the
extent to which such proceedings were followed and suggestions for
modification of the proceedings. Actually, the audit program was
prepared prior to C&L's audits of J-M for the years under investigation,
and during those audits, the only information recorded in the audit
program related to the compliance with or the inapplicability of the
procedures and their modification.
As to the tax pool analysis file, the Tenth Circuit agreed that it and
related papers did not reflect records of J-M transactions, and had
nothing to do with the preparation of returns for J-M. Rather, the
file was created for use in preparing certain financial statements and to
verify that the statements were properly reported therein. The Tenth
Circuit concluded that in seeking to obtain the file, IRS was seeking
to discover the (p. 618) "private thoughts and theories of the taxpayer."
In response to the Government assertion that issuance of the summons
was appropriate under Sec. 7602 because the tax pool analysis file
(p. 619) "might show substantial tax liability and *** the state of
mind of employees at the time the returns were filed", the Tenth Circuit
stated (pp. 619-621):
* * * the investigative powers of Sec. 7602 are not without
limitation. Although the IRS need not establish probable cause
prior to the issuance of a summons, it must establish that the
investigation is pursuant to and relevant to a legitimate pur-
pose **
** * the government should not, for the mere sake of its
convenience, impose unnecessary burdens on a taxpayer in
conducting an audit or investigation for tax liability * * *. The
term "relevant" connotes and encompasses more than "con-
venience".
The Government cannot go on a "fishing expedition through
* * * (taxpayer's) records. * * * and where it appears that the
purpose of the summons is a "rambling exploration" of a
third party's files, it will not be enforced.
The Government had contended that the audit program was properly
subject to the reach of the summons (p. 621) "as an index ***, as
a key to understanding ***" and as "the guiding document which gives
coherence, order, and logical sequence to the audit which generated the
work papers." The Tenth Circuit's pithy rejection of that contention was
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that "Mere convenience does not make an item producible under an
IRS summons."
The Noall decision 4 stands in sharp contrast to Coopers & Lybrand
on the issue of relevance. In Noall the IRS summons was directed to the
corporation itself, seeking production of its internal audit reports and
related workpapers. The Second Circuit acknowledged that internal
audit reports are not accounting records; that they are prepared by the
corporation's own personnel to insure uniform bookkeeping practices,
compliance with management directives and with internal control and
operation procedures; that they may well include hearsay, rumors,
opinions and other evidence gathered from the examination of certain
bookkeeping practices; and that the internal audit reports were not
used in preparing Noall's corporate tax returns. Despite this acknowl-
edgement, the Second Circuit concluded that the internal audit reports
and related workpapers of Noall were producible under the summons. It
adopted a so-called "might-throw-light" test for relevancy, following
the lead of at least two other circuits.47 It interpreted the term "relevant"
broadly, pointing to the fact that Sec. 7602 provides that the Secretary
or his delegate is authorized "To examine any books, papers, records,
or other data which may be relevant or material ***." (Emphasis
supplied.) In its view, Congress acted advisedly in using the verb "may
be" rather than "is", since the Commissioner cannot be certain that
the documents are relevant or material until he sees them, and (p. 126):
Clearly the purposes of the internal audit include the detec-
tion of overstatements or understatements of revenues or
expenses, and of identifying accounting procedures that would
lead to these. If the internal auditors have ascertained an
understatement of revenues or an overstatement of expenses,
this plainly might throw light on the correctness of the return.
The Noal decision, in contrast with Coopers & Lybrand, found no
significance in the fact that the internal audit reports were not used in
preparing the tax returns of the corporation. The critical consideration
was that the Commissioner's interest lay in whether the tax returns
correctly reflected the corporation's actual income, not simply whether
they were correctly prepared from the books of account and other
records used.
The question for the future is to what extent the courts, absent a
decisive Supreme Court decision in the area, will enforce summonses
4" Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (C.A. 8 1977) (en
banc); Harper and Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (C.A. 7 1970)
(per curiam), aff'd without opinion by an equally divided Court, 400 U.S. 348
(1971).
4' Caplin, "Should the Service be permitted to reach accountants' tax accrual
workpapers?", supra, p. 199.
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for tax accrual workpapers. That question, as the former Commissioner
declares, "is far from settled." 48 The IRS no doubt awaits an appro-
priate case with facts favorable to its position. In the meantime, there
are indications that the IRS will not give up easily on this issue and
that the accounting profession as well as defense lawyers will continue
to press the IRS to exercise restraint in its request for tax accrual papers.
An important question in the "privilege" area concerns the attorney-
client privilege with respect to corporate taxpayers. Several circuits49
have held that the privilege is limited to communications between cor-
porate counsel and senior management, adopting a so-called "control
group" approach. Other circuits, by contrast, have adopted a broader
"subject matter" approach.50
Illustrative of the "control group" approach is the Upjohn case. The
IRS, during audit of the taxpayer-corporation's returns for earlier years,
discovered that the company had made payments exceeding $4,000,000
to officials in many of the foreign countries in which it did business.
The company conducted an in-house investigation involving top man-
agement personnel as well as lower level company employees. Some
of the details of the payments-investigation were disclosed to the SEC
and the reports were made available to the IRS. Additionally, the cor-
poration gave the IRS information regarding $700,000 in payments
which it conceded might affect its tax liability. The IRS issued a
summons under Sec. 7602 for the production of the reports produced
by the corporation's in-house investigation regarding the remaining
$3,700,000. The corporation refused to comply, relying on the attorney-
client privilege. Rejecting the so-called "subject matter" test of the
Seventh and Eighth Circuits, under which information in the posession
of any corporate agent acquired in the normal course of his duties is
"privileged" when communicated confidentially to corporate counsel,
the Sixth Circuit adopted the narrower "control group" approach, under
which only communications between top corporate management and
counsel are privileged. In support of this conclusion, it found that under
the broader "subject matter" test, top management was encouraged to
shield themselves from unpleasant facts about possibly illegal transac-
tions and to order subordinates to communicate with counsel, with the
result that discovery would have to be directed towards the various
48 Caplin, "Should the Service be permitted to reach accountants' tax accrual
workpapers?", supra.
49 U.S. v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223 (C.A. 6 1979); pet. cert. filed. See gen-
erally, Kubak, "The Uneven Application of the Attorney Client Privilege to Cor-
porations in the Federal Courts," 6 Ga.L.Rev. 379 (1972); Note, "Attorney-Client
Privilege for Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test," 84 Harv. L. Rev. 424
(1970).
5O Diversified Industries, Inc. 572 F.2d 596 (C.A. 8 1977) (en banc); Harper
and Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (C.A. 7 1970) (per curiam),
afl'd without opinion by an equally divided Court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
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subordinate agents who may be in foreign locations, thus creating too
broad a zone of silence. Under the "control group" approach, the Court
felt that the attorney-client objective was achieved because the cor-
porate decision-makers still were allowed to communicate freely and
confidentially with counsel.
The rationale of those courts upholding the "subject matter" test in
this area is, as explained in Diversified Industries, Inc. (pp. 608-609)
that:
In a corporation, it may be necessary to glean information rele-
vant to a legal problem from middle management and non-
management personnel as well as from top executives. The
attorney dealing with a complex legal problem "is thus faced
with a 'Hobson's choice'. If he interviews employees not hav-
ing 'the very highest authority', their communications to him
will not be privileged. If, on the other hand, he interviews
only those with 'the very highest authority', he may find it ex-
tremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine what hap-
pened." * * * Thus, the control group tests inhibits the free
flow of information to a legal advisor and defeats the pur-
pose of the attorney-client privilege. * * *
* * * (The subject matter) test provides a more reasoned
approach to the problem by focusing upon why an attorney
was consulted, rather than with whom the attorney communi-
cated. * * * In contrast to the control group test, it encour-
ages the free flow of information to the corporation's counsel
in those situations where it is most needed.
* * * the limitations suggested by Judge Weinstein (2
Weinstein's Evidence, par. 503 (b)[04] have merit and * * *
the attorney-client privilege is applicable to an employee's
communication if (1) the communication was made for the
purpose of securing legal advice; (2) the employee making
the communication did so at the direction of his corporate
superior; (3) the superior made the request so that the cor-
poration could secure legal advice; (4) the subject matter of
the communication is within the scope of the employee's cor-
porate duties; and (5) the communication is not disseminated
beyond those persons who, because of the corporate structure,
need to know its contents.
In conclusion, and reflecting another block to resistance against a
summons allegedly issued in bad faith by IRS, the decision in United
States v. La Salle National Bank ' merits comment. IRS summonses
were issued to the bank for the production of files of certain land trusts
created for the benefit of the taxpayer. The bank refused to comply. In
the subsequent proceedings for enforcement, the trial court denied
enforcement on the ground that the summonses were not issued in good
51437 U.S. 298 (1978).
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faith because they were issued solely for the purpose of unearthing
evidence of criminal conduct. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. At the
enforcement hearing, there was testimony that the special agent had
conceded that the investigation of the taxpayer (p. 303) "was strictly
related to criminal violations of the Internal Revenue Code". The
District Court, which seemed to recognize that in any criminal investiga-
tion "there's always a probability of civil tax liability", nevertheless
focused its attention on the special agent's purpose in conducting the
investigation:
I'll say now that I heard nothing in Agent Olivero's testimony
to suggest that the thought of a civil investigation ever crossed
his mind.
Now, unless I find something in the in camera inspection
(of the IRS case file) that gives more support to the Govern-
ment position than the Agent's testimony did, it would be my
conclusion that he was at all times involved in a criminal
investigation, at least in his own mind.
The District Court relied on the dictum in Reisman v. Caplin"2 in
holding that it was an improper use of a summons to serve it solely for
the purpose of obtaining evidence for use in a criminal prosecution.
The Seventh Circuit regarded that finding of purpose as a factual,
rather than a legal conclusion, and applied the clearly erroneous stan-
dard despite its noting that the special agent had testified about the
existence of a civil purpose for the investigation. (It concluded that
the district court simply did not believe the special agent in that regard!)
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case. Adverting to its
prior decision in Donaldson v. United States,53 the Court concluded
that to enforce a summons under Sec. 7602, the primary requirement
is that it be issued before the IRS has recommended to the Department
of Justice the initiation of a criminal prosecution relating to the subject
matter of the summons. Donaldson also required that the summons be
issued in good faith. The Court held that the finding with respect to
the special agent's motivation in the case did not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that the summonses were not issued in good-faith pursuit of
the congressionally authorized purposes of Sec. 7602. Congress did not
categorize tax fraud investigations into civil and criminal components.
It created a tax enforcement system in which criminal and civil elements
are inherently intertwined, and any limitation on the good-faith use of
an IRS summons must reflect this statutory premise. The establishment
of the transmission of a recommendation to the Department of Justice
is, in a sense, an arbitrary cut-off point for the issuance of a summons
but nevertheless constitutes a prophylactic restraint on the use of the
52 375 U.S. 440 (1964).
53 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
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summons. Prior to a recommendation for prosecution to the Department
of Justice, the IRS must use its summons authority in good faith. There
was no departure from good faith here at the time of the issuance of the
summonses, the IRS had an institutional responsibility to calculate and
to collect civil fraud penalties and fraudulently reported or unreported
taxes. That responsibility was not overturned by the motivation of a
single agent who attempts to build a criminal case. If it could be so
overturned, it would necessarily (p. 316) "frustrate the enforcement of
the tax laws by restricting the use of the summons according to the
motivation of a single agent without regard to the enforcement policy
of the Service as an institution." (Emphasis added.) In other words,
there must be a showing of institutional bad faith. There are circum-
stances which could spell out such institutional bad faith. As the Court
observed (pp. 316-317):
Because criminal and civil fraud liabilities are coterminous,
the Service rarely will be found to have acted in bad faith by
pursuing the former. On the other hand, we cannot abandon
this aspect of the good-faith inquiry altogether. We shall not
countenance delay in submitting a recommendation to the
Justice Department when there is an institutional commitment
to make the referral and the Service merely would like to
gather additional evidence for the prosecution. Such a delay
would be tantamount to the use of the summons authority
after the recommendation and would permit the Government
to expand its criminal discovery rights. Similarly, the good-
faith standard will not permit the IRS to become an informa-
tion-gathering agency for other departments, including the
Department of Justice, regardless of the status of criminal
cases.
